{"id":5610,"date":"2017-03-24T07:27:19","date_gmt":"2017-03-23T21:27:19","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/chinaheritage.net\/?p=5610"},"modified":"2022-09-04T17:42:14","modified_gmt":"2022-09-04T07:42:14","slug":"chinas-state-of-warring-styles","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/chinaheritage.net\/journal\/chinas-state-of-warring-styles\/","title":{"rendered":"China&#8217;s State of Warring Styles"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>In modern China (as in so many other countries), <a href=\"https:\/\/cup.columbia.edu\/book\/changing-clothes-in-china\/9780231143509\">changing fashions<\/a>\u00a0have reflected the shifting\u00a0political and cultural\u00a0landscape of the country. The success of the <a href=\"http:\/\/www.chinaheritagequarterly.org\/editorial.php?issue=027\">1911 Xinhai Revolution<\/a> not only saw the abdication of the last Chinese emperor, it also ushered in the Zhongshan Suit \u4e2d\u5c71\u88dd (known in the international media as the Mao Jacket)\u00a0designed for the revolutionary leader Sun Yat-sen (Sun Zhongshan), an item of clothing\u00a0replete with revolutionary symbolism. Although other\u00a0revolutions led to calls of &#8216;Off With Their Heads!&#8217;, in China the 1911 Revolution did bring about\u00a0the <a href=\"http:\/\/www.chinaheritagequarterly.org\/features.php?searchterm=027_queue.inc&amp;issue=027\">End of the Queue<\/a>\u00a0\u8fae\u5b50, a hairstyle imposed by the throne in the early years of the Qing dynasty nearly three hundred years earlier.<\/p>\n<figure id=\"attachment_5622\" aria-describedby=\"caption-attachment-5622\" style=\"width: 190px\" class=\"wp-caption alignleft\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"size-full wp-image-5622\" src=\"https:\/\/chinaheritage.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2017\/03\/Yongzheng.jpeg\" alt=\"\" width=\"190\" height=\"265\" \/><figcaption id=\"caption-attachment-5622\" class=\"wp-caption-text\">Prince Yong \u548c\u78a9\u96cd\u89aa\u738b, Aisin-Gioro Injen \u611b\u65b0\u89ba\u7f85\u00b7\u80e4\u799b, later the Yongzheng emperor, <em>H\u016bwaliyasun Tob h\u016bwangdi<\/em>.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<p>Chinese robes, Manchu fashion, Western suits, revolutionary garb: the clash over styles, ideology and consumerism continues to this day. As early as the Yongzheng \u96cd\u6b63 reign of the Qing dynasty (1723-1735), the ruler felt he had to defend the animal festooned gowns of his officials\u00a0against charges that they represented barbarian bestiality. Qing court attire was derided by those loyal to the fallen house of the Ming as nothing more than &#8216;peacock feather caps and horse-hoof sleeved robes: the vestments of birds and beasts&#8217; \u5b54\u96c0\u7fce\u99ac\u8e44\u8896\u8863\u51a0\u4e2d\u79bd\u7378. Yongzheng championed the virtue of Qing rule, and its wardrobe in\u00a0his <a href=\"http:\/\/www.eacrh.net\/ojs\/index.php\/crossroads\/article\/view\/27\/Vol5_Crossley_html\"><em>Record of Awakening to Righteousness<\/em>\u00a0\u5927\u7fa9\u89ba\u8ff7\u9304<\/a>. Two hundred and fifty years later, Chinese\u00a0Communists and their foreign ideology\u00a0were\u00a0decried for being like a Disastrous Flood and Wild Beasts \u6d2a\u6c34\u731b\u7378. Today the Party and its Chairman of Everything, Xi Jinping, affirm that they rule by virtue \u5fb7\u653f; nonetheless, they still\u00a0walk a cultural\u00a0tightrope: defending their vision of China on one hand while espousing\u00a0a heavily edited version of a tradition they originally\u00a0rejected\u00a0on the other.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: center;\">***<\/p>\n<p>In March 2014, President Xi Jinping and China&#8217;s First Lady, Peng Liyuan \u5f6d\u9e97\u5a9b, embarked on a series of state visits, including to Belgium. Peng, who previously enjoyed a successful career as a singer, is known for her personal style and engaging manner. She was particularly prominent during the couple&#8217;s European tour for her wardrobe.<\/p>\n<figure id=\"attachment_5627\" aria-describedby=\"caption-attachment-5627\" style=\"width: 640px\" class=\"wp-caption aligncenter\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"size-large wp-image-5627\" src=\"https:\/\/chinaheritage.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2017\/03\/fullsizeoutput_9f5-649x1024.jpeg\" alt=\"\" width=\"640\" height=\"1010\" srcset=\"https:\/\/chinaheritage.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2017\/03\/fullsizeoutput_9f5-649x1024.jpeg 649w, https:\/\/chinaheritage.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2017\/03\/fullsizeoutput_9f5-190x300.jpeg 190w, https:\/\/chinaheritage.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2017\/03\/fullsizeoutput_9f5-768x1213.jpeg 768w, https:\/\/chinaheritage.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2017\/03\/fullsizeoutput_9f5.jpeg 1218w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 640px) 100vw, 640px\" \/><figcaption id=\"caption-attachment-5627\" class=\"wp-caption-text\">Peng Liyuan and Xi Jinping in neo-trad garb during their March\u00a02014 state visit to Belgium. Source: press.cn<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<p>&#8216;First Lady Diplomacy&#8217; and the dress of leaders&#8217; wives have a chequered history in the People&#8217;s Republic. Wang Guangmei \u738b\u5149\u7f8e, wife of president Liu Shaoqi \u5289\u5c11\u5947, attracted considerable attention when she wore a white <em>cheong-sam\/qipao<\/em> and a pearl necklace during a state visit to Indonesia in April 1963. A few years later, she was subjected to cruel parody by Red Guards in the Cultural Revolution and suffered public humiliation by being dressed in a mock <em>cheong-sam<\/em> and made to wear a necklace made out of ping-pong balls during a mass denunciation rally.<\/p>\n<p>Jiang Qing \u6c5f\u9752, Mao Zedong&#8217;s wife and paragon of the Cultural Revolution, was known for her austere style of dress. She even had a hand in designing a &#8216;national costume&#8217; \u570b\u670d for women in 1974 to parallel the Mao Jacket.<\/p>\n<p>Peng Liyuan is the first leader&#8217;s spouse since Jiang Qing to make a fashion statement and, in the March 2014 trip to Belgium, she appeared in a heavily embroidered traditional- style ensemble. For his part, Xi Jinping wore a reimagined Zhongshan suit, the four pockets of the Mao jacket being replaced by two pockets and a concealed pocket on the chest with a Western-style pocket square. Such forays into Sino-fashion, however, are rare: generally Xi wears a business suit, unless he&#8217;s visiting the troops or making some major Party pronouncement in which case he dons revolutionary garb; and Peng Liyuan&#8217;s style is more in sync with that of Melania or Ivanka Trump than that of a Ming matriarch\u00a0(see my &#8216;Public Appearance&#8217;, in <a href=\"http:\/\/press-files.anu.edu.au\/downloads\/press\/p328871\/pdf\/introduction1.pdf\">Under One Heaven<\/a>, the introduction to the 2014 <em>China Story Yearbook: Shared Community<\/em>,\u00a0p.xv).<\/p>\n<p>The author of the following essay, Kevin Carrico, introduces us to the unsettling\u00a0world of the Han-Chinese Clothing Movement, one whose adherents\u00a0feel betrayed by reality. Zealots supporting Han purity have been prominent since the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom civil war of the mid-nineteenth century when the Christian rebels launched racial attacks on the Manchus. Later in the century racist radicals like Zhang Taiyan \u7ae0\u592a\u708e helped foster a popular hysteria that, in the first decade of the Republic of China, led to bloody anti-Manchu pogroms. Now, a century later, some Han purists even discuss a Final Solution for China&#8217;s borderland peoples (extermination, internment camps, exile).<\/p>\n<p>Inspired by the post-June Fourth state-nationalism orchestrated by the Communist Party (something I described at length in <a href=\"https:\/\/www.ou.edu\/uschina\/texts\/Barme95CJForeigners.pdf\">To Screw Foreigners is Patriotic<\/a>\u00a0in 1995), China Clothing advocates draw their ideas from a miscellany of sources. These include period dramas, Peking opera, kung-fu movies, Hong Kong and Taiwan culture, and so on. They meld paranoia and racism with romanticism; their views\u00a0are steeped in\u00a0the political quackery of the party-state, which long ago\u00a0created an\u00a0alternate-facts world for China. It is the world of\u00a0Han supremacists like\u00a0Zhai Quan&#8217;an \u7fdf\u5168\u5b89, <a href=\"http:\/\/www.chinaheritagequarterly.org\/articles.php?searchterm=020_zhai_quanan.inc&amp;issue=020\">interviewed<\/a>\u00a0in 2008 by the\u00a0oral historian Sang Ye \u6851\u66c4 as part of <em><a href=\"https:\/\/chinaheritage.net\/the-rings-of-beijing\/\">The Rings of Beijing<\/a><\/em> project.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: center;\">***<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"http:\/\/mq.academia.edu\/KevinCarrico\">Kevin Carrico<\/a>\u00a0is a lecturer in the Department of International Studies (Modern Languages and Cultures) at Macquarie University. He is the author of <a href=\"http:\/\/www.ucpress.edu\/book.php?isbn=9780520295506\"><i>The Great Han: Race, Nationalism, and Tradition<\/i><\/a>, University of California Press. The following essay was edited to accord with the style of\u00a0<i>China Heritage<\/i>\u00a0and it is published here as a chapter in\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/chinaheritage.net\/new-sinology-jottings\/\"><em>New Sinology Jottings<\/em><\/a>.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: right;\">\u2014\u00a0Geremie R. Barm\u00e9,<br \/>\nEditor, <em>China Heritage<\/em><br \/>\n24 March 2017<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: center;\">***<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: left;\"><strong>Suggested Reading<\/strong><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li style=\"text-align: left;\">Mark Elliott,\u00a0<a href=\"http:\/\/www.chinaheritagequarterly.org\/scholarship.php?searchterm=019_han_studies_elliott.inc&amp;issue=019\"><i>Hushuo<\/i>\u00a0\u80e1\u8aaa: The Northern Other and\u00a0<i>Han<\/i>\u00a0Ethnogenesis<\/a>,\u00a0<em>China Heritage Quarterly<\/em>, Issue 19 (September 2009)<\/li>\n<li style=\"text-align: left;\">James Leibold,\u00a0<a href=\"http:\/\/www.chinaheritagequarterly.org\/scholarship.php?searchterm=019_han_studies_leibold.inc&amp;issue=019\">In Search of Han:\u00a0Early Twentieth-century Narratives on Chinese Origins and Development<\/a>,\u00a0<em>China Heritage Quarterly<\/em>, Issue 19 (September 2009)<\/li>\n<li style=\"text-align: left;\">Tom Mullaney, <a href=\"http:\/\/www.chinaheritagequarterly.org\/scholarship.php?searchterm=019_han_studies.inc&amp;issue=019\">Introducing Critical Han Studies<\/a>,\u00a0<em>China Heritage\u00a0<\/em><i>Quarterly<\/i>, Issue 19 (September 2009)<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<hr \/>\n<h3 style=\"text-align: center;\"><b>A\u00a0State\u00a0of Warring Styles<\/b><\/h3>\n<h4 style=\"text-align: center;\"><strong>Kevin Carrico<\/strong><\/h4>\n<h4 style=\"text-align: center;\">One Picture, Many Thousands of Words<\/h4>\n<p>In the autumn of 2001, leaders from across the Asia-Pacific gathered in Shanghai for the annual ministerial meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). It was a month after September 11 and the theme of the gathering was \u2018meeting new challenges in the new century\u2019. Organizers and participants could not have guessed that this occasion would give birth to a new Chinese nationalist movement dedicated to meeting new challenges in the new century by seeking recourse to the heritage of the past. This new movement would be called the Han Clothing Movement \u6f22\u670d\u904b\u52d5.<\/p>\n<figure id=\"attachment_5612\" aria-describedby=\"caption-attachment-5612\" style=\"width: 230px\" class=\"wp-caption alignright\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"size-full wp-image-5612\" src=\"https:\/\/chinaheritage.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2017\/03\/APEC2001.jpg\" alt=\"\" width=\"230\" height=\"163\" \/><figcaption id=\"caption-attachment-5612\" class=\"wp-caption-text\">Vladimir Putin, George W. Bush and Jiang Zemin at the Shanghai APEC meeting in September 2001.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<p>Ever since US President Bill Clinton handed out bomber jackets during the 1993 Seattle Summit, APEC leaders have been obliged to don \u2018local dress\u2019 from the host region for cringe-making photo-ops that are supposed to represent the harmony between leaders and nations.[1] In this not so time-honoured fashion, leaders at the 2001 Shanghai meeting gathered, decked out in a traditional-looking Chinoiserie jacket referred to by the hosts as \u2018Tang clothing\u2019 \u5510\u88dd. Images of US President George W. Bush, China\u2019s party-state leader Jiang Zemin, and Russian President Vladimir Putin engaged in earnest conversation dressed in this mock-Chinese costume posing as a modern-day refraction of traditional Chinese culture soon saturated the official media, the Sinophone Internet and the world wide web.<\/p>\n<p>The \u2018Tang clothing\u2019 was presented as some form of traditional Chinese costume (the word \u2018Tang\u2019 \u5510 has long been used to connote Chineseness among international Chinese communities). But for eagle-eyed observers there was a problem: the APEC Chinese jackets was actually a <a href=\"https:\/\/zh.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/\u9a6c\u8902\"><i>magua<\/i> \u99ac\u8902<\/a><i> <\/i>or, in Manchu, an <i>olbo<\/i>. This form of male Manchu dress was popularised during the Manchu occupation of China from 1644.[2] Ninety years after the fall of the Qing, the denunciation of which was a hallmark of patriotism, Chineseness was being represented on the global stage by the clothes of a former oppressor, a conquest dynasty despised by Chinese patriots throughout the twentieth century for its role in the country\u2019s previous decline and humiliation.<\/p>\n<p>To recast Mao Zedong\u2019s famous line \u2018A Spark Can Start a Prairie Fire\u2019 \u661f\u661f\u4e4b\u706b\u53ef\u4ee5\u71ce\u539f, the display of Manchu dress, <i>Manfu <\/i>\u6eff\u670d, at APEC 2001 provided the spark that started a Han-Chinese prairie fire. According to accounts of the populist sartorial movement emerging in response to that well-intentioned APEC photo-op, a now untraceable post distributed on a number of BBS forums criticised the Chinese government\u2019s decision to dress global leaders in the reviled <i>magua<\/i>. The author of the post said it would have been far more appropriate for China to promote the traditional style clothing of the Han majority, or <i>Hanfu <\/i>\u6f22\u670d. In reality, <i>Hanfu <\/i>is an invented style of dress that features broad sleeves, flowing robes, belted waists and vibrant colours. Its modern-day proponents claim it was the invention of the mythical Yellow Emperor and was worn for millennia by the Chinese people.<\/p>\n<figure id=\"attachment_5613\" aria-describedby=\"caption-attachment-5613\" style=\"width: 478px\" class=\"wp-caption alignleft\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"size-full wp-image-5613\" src=\"https:\/\/chinaheritage.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2017\/03\/IMG_2223.jpg\" alt=\"\" width=\"478\" height=\"748\" srcset=\"https:\/\/chinaheritage.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2017\/03\/IMG_2223.jpg 478w, https:\/\/chinaheritage.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2017\/03\/IMG_2223-192x300.jpg 192w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 478px) 100vw, 478px\" \/><figcaption id=\"caption-attachment-5613\" class=\"wp-caption-text\">A widely circulated artistic representation of &#8216;Han Clothing&#8217; by an online artist.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<p>The Han had supposedly long been a relatively restrained and undecorated ethnicity, in contrast to China\u2019s \u2018colorful\u2019 singing-and-dancing minorities. Now, the suggestion that they also had \u2018traditional clothing\u2019 that could be their own yet again created an online sensation. In the wake of APEC, discussion boards proliferated, the most prominent being <a href=\"http:\/\/www.hanminzu.net\">www.hanminzu.net<\/a>. They provided virtual gathering points for patriotic Han Clothing enthusiasts. Soon, devotees had made their own Han Clothing and were posting photos of their handiwork. Shortly thereafter, members of this spontaneous sartorial club were publishing photos of themselves wearing Han Clothing in public.<\/p>\n<p>The most celebrated of these initial Warriors of the Cloth was Wang Letian \u738b\u6a02\u5929, who uploaded photographs of himself parading through the streets of Zhengzhou in <i>Hanfu<\/i>. He styled himself heroically under the rubric \u2018Grand Aspiration\u2019 \u58ef\u5fd7\u51cc\u96f2. It&#8217;s a pen name that resonates with the opening line of one of Mao&#8217;s most famous late poems (the 1965 poem \u2018Reascending Chingkangshan\u2019, released in 1976: \u4e45\u6709\u51cc\u96f2\u5fd7\uff0f\u91cd\u4e0a\u4e95\u5ca1\u5c71, which was something of a call to arms), and it also happens to be the Chinese title of Tom Cruise\u2019s 1986 blockbuster <i>Top Gun<\/i>. Wang\u2019s \u2018maverick\u2019 photographs had a galvanising effect on netizens, and soon people were imitating his grandiloquent performance in cities throughout China. In this process, Han Clothing made the transition from a fantastic invented tradition to a distant image on a screen to a physical reality in the streets of China, in which one could wrap and recognise oneself.<\/p>\n<figure id=\"attachment_5655\" aria-describedby=\"caption-attachment-5655\" style=\"width: 300px\" class=\"wp-caption alignright\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"size-full wp-image-5655\" src=\"https:\/\/chinaheritage.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2017\/03\/\u738b\u4e50\u5929.jpg\" alt=\"\" width=\"300\" height=\"480\" srcset=\"https:\/\/chinaheritage.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2017\/03\/\u738b\u4e50\u5929.jpg 300w, https:\/\/chinaheritage.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2017\/03\/\u738b\u4e50\u5929-188x300.jpg 188w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px\" \/><figcaption id=\"caption-attachment-5655\" class=\"wp-caption-text\">Wang Letian takes to the streets in 2003. The <em>Hanfu<\/em>\u00a0makeover doesn&#8217;t go as far as his hair and it leaves his western-style trousers and patent leather shoes untouched.\u00a0\u2014 <em>Ed<\/em>.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<p>From 2003, Han Clothing associations have sprung up, most particularly in coastal cities, but also in the interior. (Cities with one or more associations include: Shenzhen, Dongguan, Guangzhou, Foshan, Xiamen, Hangzhou, Shanghai, Suzhou, Nanjing, Wuhan, Hefei, Zhengzhou, Jinan, Beijing, Tianjin, Xi\u2019an, Chengdu, Chongqing and Kunming.) These Associations host monthly or fortnightly gatherings, although some enthusiasts meet weekly, eagerly expanding their membership and promoting the movement\u2019s vision of traditional Han culture. Their activities include visits to museums, temples, teahouses, or parks, the reenactment of \u2018traditional\u2019 rituals, promotional efforts aimed at greater visibility and the identification of potential converts in crowded downtown areas. They also involve participation in ethnic clothing shows, from which the Han had long been absent, traditional music concerts and self-produced variety shows.<\/p>\n<p>For Han Clothing devotees, the promotion of the eternal apparel of the Han is the most natural of activities, as is the revitalisation of traditional culture more broadly. In my time spent with movement participants, however, I found that despite this focus upon the past, the movement was primarily a product of the present and its contradictions, of which Han Clothing was at once a symptom and an attempted cure.<\/p>\n<h4 style=\"text-align: center;\">The Land of Rites and Etiquette<\/h4>\n<p>Talking with participants in the Han Clothing Movement, an unabashedly nationalist group, I had at first expected to hear more of the usual talk about the unique glory of China with which I had long been familiar. Yet for a group dedicated to celebrating the idea of China, the sheer amount of time that participants spent complaining about contemporary China was surprising.<\/p>\n<p>At a gathering in a Shenzhen restaurant in 2010, a Han Clothing enthusiast from rural Anhui who was in his late twenties asked: \u2018How much do you know about traditional Chinese culture?\u2019 It was a rhetorical question: he immediately highlighted for me four components of tradition, namely clothing, food, housing and transport \u8863\u98df\u4f4f\u884c. He assured me that these were the core of Han, and thus Chinese, traditional culture.<\/p>\n<p>In the dynastic era, he opined, \u2018clothing\u2019 \u8863 was elaborate and beautiful. Proper attire was a central, ordering component of society. Establishing a metaphorical relationship between the individual body and the social body, he said: only when clothing was in proper order could society be put in order. But nowadays, he sighed, the Chinese don Western-style apparel made from synthetic fibres. Men wear sneakers and Western suits that never quite fit their bodies, and women, he asserted, walk around exposing their breasts and buttocks; it&#8217;s in violation of appropriate dress codes and an affront to national dignity. This Han Clothing gathering, he assured me, would allow me to finally see authentic \u2018Eastern clothes\u2019.<\/p>\n<p>Another core component of Chinese culture, he continued, is \u2018eating\u2019 \u98df. Chinese cuisine is rich and diverse, extending from the delicate cuisine of Shanghai to the numbing spice of Sichuan and down to the refined gastronomy of Guangdong. And throughout history, the social experience of sharing a meal has created lasting bonds between people. Yet, he quickly added, nowadays food is not always safe; you have to be careful of what you eat. There is the infamous gutter oil \u5730\u6e9d\u6cb9 (unclean cooking oil that is endlessly recycled in restaurants), genetically modified foods and even fake eggs. \u2018Fake eggs might look better than real eggs,\u2019 he said, &#8216;but below the surface they\u2019re made of cancer-causing agents.\u2019 We stared at the dishes before us, which had long before grown cold.<\/p>\n<p>Under the rubric of &#8216;living&#8217; \u4f4f, my interlocutor affirmed traditional architecture: \u2018nowadays, we think that we are more advanced than the ancients. But in many ways, they were much smarter, and had answers to many questions that are now lost.\u2019 Citing the canals supposedly created by the legendary Yu the Great \u5927\u79b9 to control flooding of the Yellow River, he told me with a look of certainty that these canals and riverbeds remain strong to this day. Pointing to the skyscrapers outside, he asked: \u2018How long do you think those buildings will last? These days, apartments start falling apart long before you\u2019ve even paid off your loan.\u2019<\/p>\n<p>With a sigh, he told me \u2018the China out there, the China that you are visiting, that is absolutely not the real China\u2019 \u4e0d\u662f\u771f\u6b63\u7684\u4e2d\u570b. In that moment, I was left to make sense of a member of a nationalist group telling me that his nation was not, in its current form at least, real. This confounding situation, in my analysis, revealed the fundamentally paradoxical core of the Han Clothing Movement and the nationalist experience that it represents. Beyond bland descriptions of nations as imagined communities passing through \u2018homogeneous, empty time\u2019,[3] or the not particularly adrenaline-charged idea that \u2018the political and national unit should be congruent\u2019,[4] for the nationalist nations are far more exhilarating. They are imaginary communities that embody one\u2019s greatest aspirations. Yet as a result, as highlighted in this monologue, nations are also freighted with one\u2019s greatest disappointments.<\/p>\n<p>Such dissonance is also evident in the discourse surrounding the \u2018Rise of China\u2019. The revitalization \u5fa9\u8208 of China is based on the idea-cum-belief that the nation should recapture a presumed preeminent place of respect and reverence in the global hierarchy. On the quotidian and human level, however, the rise of China is accompanied by rising social tensions, pollution indices, living costs, crime rates, health risks and general social anomie. The nation as an experienced geographical space is trapped at an untraversable distance from the nation as fantasy: the \u2018land of rites and etiquette\u2019 \u79ae\u5100\u4e4b\u90a6.<\/p>\n<h4 style=\"text-align: center;\">An Ongoing Xinhai Revolution<\/h4>\n<figure id=\"attachment_5614\" aria-describedby=\"caption-attachment-5614\" style=\"width: 640px\" class=\"wp-caption aligncenter\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"size-large wp-image-5614\" src=\"https:\/\/chinaheritage.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2017\/03\/IMG_2224-1024x768.jpg\" alt=\"\" width=\"640\" height=\"480\" srcset=\"https:\/\/chinaheritage.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2017\/03\/IMG_2224-1024x768.jpg 1024w, https:\/\/chinaheritage.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2017\/03\/IMG_2224-300x225.jpg 300w, https:\/\/chinaheritage.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2017\/03\/IMG_2224-768x576.jpg 768w, https:\/\/chinaheritage.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2017\/03\/IMG_2224.jpg 1777w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 640px) 100vw, 640px\" \/><figcaption id=\"caption-attachment-5614\" class=\"wp-caption-text\">Han Clothing Movement members commemorating the Seventy-two Martyrs of the Second Guangzhou Uprising against the Qing at Huanghuagang Martyrs\u2019 Cemetery in Guangzhou, October 2010.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<p>Academic debates over the history of race and essentialism in China are of little interest to Han Clothing enthusiasts; they are participants in a popular racial-nationalist movement. Within their worldview, \u2018Han\u2019 is a biological and racial category whose purity was maintained throughout the dynastic era via a distinction between civilisation and barbarism. When I attempted to dig a little deeper on this question of purity, participants would acknowledge that there may have been intermarriage between the civilised peoples of China\u2019s Central Plain and invading barbarians, but it was only ever intermarriage between Han males and barbarian women \u2014 no civilised Han woman would have ever married a barbarian male. According to this narrative, the imagined dominance of male chromosomes, based on patrilineal cultural assumptions, meant that Han male DNA would erase any trace of female barbarian miscegenation within three generations. Han purity is always victorious.<\/p>\n<p>In movement histories, this seemingly invincible purity suffers a radical break in China\u2019s late-dynastic period. First there is the rise of what is denigrated as the \u2018Mongolian-Yuan\u2019 dynasty (1271-1368), which Han Clothing zealots characterise as being non-Chinese, flying in the face of the carefully crafted party-state narrative of a unified Chinese history. Although the Yuan aberration was corrected by the rise of the Han-led Ming dynasty (1368-1644), the Ming eventually fell to another invader barbarian race, the Manchus. The Qing dynasty (1644-1912), according to Han Clothing Movement advocates, was the first extended campaign in a racial war that continues to this day.<\/p>\n<p>\u2018If you hand the Mandate of Heaven over to a bunch of barbarians,\u2019 one participant commented, \u2018what do you expect to happen?\u2019 Han Clothing Movement narratives portray the Manchu rulers of the Qing as single-mindedly dedicated to the destruction of the Han and thus of China itself. The real violence, for example, of the Ten Days in Yangzhou \u63da\u5dde\u5341\u65e5, during which a Manchu-led massacre devastated the city of Yangzhou, or the queue edict issued by the Manchu court imposing a particular hairstyle on Manchu and Han males alike, is combined with imaginary violence of the forcible erasure of Han Clothing.[5] Through such violence, it is asserted, the Manchus fundamentally transformed Chinese society, making it into an Other of itself, and thereby shifting its essence from civilisation to barbarism. Today, Han Clothing devotees claim that such \u2018uncivilised practices\u2019 as spitting, line cutting, forcing others to drink alcohol, or corruption are the product of the Manchu taint. Thereby an historical \u2018amnesty&#8217; is declared exonerating Han people from complicity and responsibly for the state of contemporary China, a state that Hanfu enthusiasts reject.<\/p>\n<p>This convenient historical amnesty keeps alive the fantasy of an eternal \u2018true Han society\u2019, one that is completely different from the present, and that can be best be realised through the programme of the Han Clothing Movement. Against the never-ending violence of the Manchus, movement participants posit a narrative of equally unyielding Han resistance: a permanent Xinhai Revolution. While 1911 was a political <a href=\"http:\/\/www.chinaheritagequarterly.org\/editorial.php?issue=027\">Xinhai Revolution \u8f9b\u4ea5\u9769\u547d<\/a> that led directly to the fall of hated Manchu-Qing rule, 1945 and 1949 are characterised as military Xinhai Revolutions. The Cultural Revolution of the 1960s, in turn, is reinterpreted as a Cultural Xinhai Revolution, targeting not traditional Chinese culture, but rather insidious Manchu culture. This narrative of the ceaseless Xinhai allows movement participants to cherish their idea of traditional culture while also continuing to idolise Mao Zedong: his drive to sweep away tradition in 1966 by \u2018Smashing the Four Olds\u2019 \u7834\u56db\u820a, for example, was in reality the work of a cunning and clandestine anti-Manchu warrior.<\/p>\n<figure id=\"attachment_5615\" aria-describedby=\"caption-attachment-5615\" style=\"width: 582px\" class=\"wp-caption aligncenter\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"size-full wp-image-5615\" src=\"https:\/\/chinaheritage.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2017\/03\/IMG_2225.jpg\" alt=\"\" width=\"582\" height=\"800\" srcset=\"https:\/\/chinaheritage.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2017\/03\/IMG_2225.jpg 582w, https:\/\/chinaheritage.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2017\/03\/IMG_2225-218x300.jpg 218w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 582px) 100vw, 582px\" \/><figcaption id=\"caption-attachment-5615\" class=\"wp-caption-text\">Former Family Planning Commission Minister Li Bin portrayed as a \u2018Murderous Manchu Animal\u2019 specialising in \u2018Killing Han Babies\u2019.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<p>After seven decades of permanent Xinhai revolutions, however, movement participants argue that there is still a dangerous conspiracy in contemporary China; it is a secret Manchu plan for restoration that has been underway from the start of the post-1978 reform era. In meticulously documented conspiracy theory tracts\u00a0traded online and shared in group meetings, Han Clothing Movement zealots argue that Manchus secretly control every important party-state institution: the People\u2019s Liberation Army, the Party Propaganda Department, as well as the Ministry of Culture. The secretive nature of organisations like the Han Clothing Movement itself, makes them an ideal hotbed for such conspiracy theories. Denials that a certain official may in fact have a Manchu heritage, furthermore, is viewed as veiled confirmation of just such a heritage. This ensures that conspiracy theorists can detect surreptitious Manchu aggressors anywhere and everywhere.<\/p>\n<p>The State Family Planning and Population Commission, for instance, is regarded as a stronghold of Manchu influence. It is believed that its one-child policy is but an escalation of the long-term Manchu genocide that targets the Han. After all, as movement participants asked me on numerous occasions: \u2018Does this [the one-child policy] seem like something that one race would do to its own people?\u2019<\/p>\n<h4 style=\"text-align: center;\">Re-creating Real China<b><br \/>\n<\/b><\/h4>\n<p>The name Han Clothing Movement, <i>Hanfu yundong\u00a0<\/i>\u6f22\u670d\u904b\u52d5, encapsulates the movement\u2019s response to the dilemmas of life today. <i>Hanfu<\/i> or \u2018Han Clothing\u2019, purportedly a sartorial code passed down through the ages from the time of the Yellow Emperor, provides a seemingly concrete link to a distant yet also more genuine past. Its revival reintroduces lost grandeur and aesthetics into the dreary and distressing present. <i>Yundong<\/i>, by contrast, is a term derived from the Maoist vocabulary of political mobilisation. Here, rather than the countryside surrounding the city \u8fb2\u6751\u5305\u570d\u57ce\u5e02, the movement promotes a sacred tradition surrounding profane reality, declaring an aestheticised warfare on the dictatorship of the real.<\/p>\n<hr \/>\n<p><strong>Editorial Update<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>On 15 March 2017, to great online fanfare <a href=\"https:\/\/zh.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/\u5468\u5c0f\u5e73\">Zhou Xiaoping \u5468\u5c0f\u5e73<\/a>, a man derided in the non-official media as party-state leader Xi Jinping&#8217;s Internet courtier (in October 2014,\u00a0Xi had extolled Wang&#8217;s online logorrhoea as representing pro-Party &#8216;positive energy&#8217; \u6b63\u80fd\u91cf), announced his marriage to\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/zh.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/\u738b\u82b3_(\u6b4c\u624b)\">Wang Fang \u738b\u82b3<\/a>, a popular songstress known for cloying renditions of revolutionary songs \u7d05\u6b4c. The nuptials\u00a0featured\u00a0a pastiche ceremony and pictures emerged of the couple swaddled in\u00a0<em>Hanfu<\/em> costume.<\/p>\n<figure id=\"attachment_5667\" aria-describedby=\"caption-attachment-5667\" style=\"width: 454px\" class=\"wp-caption aligncenter\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"size-full wp-image-5667\" src=\"https:\/\/chinaheritage.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2017\/03\/ZhouXiaopingWangFangWedding.png\" alt=\"\" width=\"454\" height=\"635\" srcset=\"https:\/\/chinaheritage.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2017\/03\/ZhouXiaopingWangFangWedding.png 454w, https:\/\/chinaheritage.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2017\/03\/ZhouXiaopingWangFangWedding-214x300.png 214w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 454px) 100vw, 454px\" \/><figcaption id=\"caption-attachment-5667\" class=\"wp-caption-text\">The widely reported (and lambasted) Zhou-Wang wedding, 15 March 2017.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<p>Zhou proudly announced to his new bride (and to any media outlet that gave a damn): &#8216;My body belongs to the State, but my heart is yours!&#8217; \u8eab\u8a31\u570b\u5bb6\uff0c\u5fc3\u8a31\u4f60.<\/p>\n<p>For more on Zhou Xiaoping, see Zhang Lifan \u7ae0\u7acb\u51e1, <a href=\"https:\/\/botanwang.com\/articles\/201411\/\u7ae0\u7acb\u51e1\uff1a\u6bcf\u4e00\u4e2a\u7687\u5e1d\u90fd\u9700\u8981\u5974\u624d%E3%80%80.html\">Every Emperor Needs Slavish Courtiers\u00a0\u6bcf\u4e00\u4e2a\u7687\u5e1d\u90fd\u9700\u8981\u5974\u624d<\/a>, 28 November 2014, for the English version in the <i>New York Times<\/i> Sinosphere blog, see <a href=\"https:\/\/mobile.nytimes.com\/blogs\/sinosphere\/2014\/11\/27\/q-and-a-zhang-lifan-on-the-new-chinese-nationalism\/?referer=\">here<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>My thanks to Sang Ye for alerting me to the Zhou-Wang alliance.<\/p>\n<p>In April 2018, David Bandurski of <em>China Media Project<\/em> reported on &#8216;Sunshine Boy&#8217; \u6696\u7537 Zhou&#8217;s fall from grace. This seems to have been occasioned by the ouster of his patron, Lu Wei\u00a0\u9b6f\u7152, the\u00a0head of the Cyberspace Administration of China who had been arrested on charges of corruption. See\u00a0David Bandurski, <a href=\"http:\/\/chinamediaproject.org\/2018\/04\/05\/sunset-for-chinas-sunshine-boy\/\">Sunset for China&#8217;s &#8216;Sunshine Boy&#8217;<\/a>, China Media Project, 5 April 2018.<\/p>\n<hr \/>\n<p><b>Notes<\/b><\/p>\n<p>[1] A series of photographs illustrating the history of this politico-sartorial practice can be found at <a href=\"http:\/\/www.guardian.co.uk\/world\/gallery\/2011\/nov\/14\/apec-summits-what-leaders-wore-in-pictures#\/?picture=381825716&amp;index=5\">APEC Summits: what the leaders wore \u2014 in pictures<\/a>. This APEC tradition was abandoned at the 2011 APEC summit in Hawai\u2019i. According to US President Barack Obama\u2019s reflections on aloha shirts and APEC:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>I got rid of the Hawaiian shirts because I looked at pictures of some of the previous APEC meetings and some of the garb that appeared previously and I thought this might be a tradition that we might want to break.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>See Adam Taylor, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.washingtonpost.com\/news\/worldviews\/wp\/2014\/11\/10\/apecs-silly-shirts-the-awkward-tradition-that-wont-go-away\/?utm_term=.ce4232986b27\">APEC\u2019s silly shirts: the awkward tradition that won\u2019t go away<\/a>, <i>Washington Post<\/i>, 10 November 2014.<\/p>\n<p>[2] Hazel Clark, <i>The Cheongsam,<\/i> Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.<\/p>\n<p>[3] Benedict Anderson, <i>Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism,<\/i> London: Verso, 1983.<\/p>\n<p>[4] Ernest Gellner, <i>Nations and Nationalism<\/i>, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983.<\/p>\n<p>[5] Edward J.M. Rhoads, tracing sartorial policy in the Qing Dynasty, notes that the adoption of Manchu clothing was only required of the male scholar-official elite: \u2018the great majority of Han men were free to continue to dress as they had during the Ming,\u2019 as were women. Although historically inaccurate, the movement narrative of the forced suppression of <i>Hanfu <\/i>in the early Qing conveniently helps to explain the current unfamiliarity with this invented tradition. See Edward Rhoads, <i>Manchus and Han: Ethnic Relations and Political Power in Late Qing and Early Republican China, 1861-1928<\/i>, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2000, pp.61-62.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>In modern China (as in so many other countries), changing fashions\u00a0have reflected the shifting\u00a0political and cultural\u00a0landscape of the country. The success of the 1911 Xinhai Revolution not only saw the abdication of the last Chinese emperor, it also ushered in the Zhongshan Suit \u4e2d\u5c71\u88dd (known in the international media as the Mao Jacket)\u00a0designed for the [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":29579,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"jetpack_post_was_ever_published":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_access":"","footnotes":"","jetpack_publicize_message":"","jetpack_is_tweetstorm":false,"jetpack_publicize_feature_enabled":true,"jetpack_social_post_already_shared":false,"jetpack_social_options":{"image_generator_settings":{"template":"highway","enabled":false}}},"categories":[12,3],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-5610","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-essays","category-journal"],"jetpack_publicize_connections":[],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"https:\/\/chinaheritage.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2017\/03\/EB8DD954-2EDB-4B6F-A27B-2D7ED234363B.jpeg","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"jetpack_shortlink":"https:\/\/wp.me\/p9gcZ6-1su","post_mailing_queue_ids":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/chinaheritage.net\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5610"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/chinaheritage.net\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/chinaheritage.net\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/chinaheritage.net\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/chinaheritage.net\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=5610"}],"version-history":[{"count":61,"href":"https:\/\/chinaheritage.net\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5610\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":29584,"href":"https:\/\/chinaheritage.net\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5610\/revisions\/29584"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/chinaheritage.net\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/29579"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/chinaheritage.net\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=5610"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/chinaheritage.net\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=5610"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/chinaheritage.net\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=5610"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}